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A HOUSE DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF: A
COMMENT ON "MASTERY, SLAVERY,
AND EMANCIPATION"
Kendall Thomas*
Bifurcation is the source of the need for philosophy.
-G. W.F. Hegel 1
[T]he destiny of the Negroes is . . . interwoven with that of the
Europeans. These two races are fastened to each other without intermingling; and they are alike unable to separate entirely or to
combine.
-Alexis de Tocqueville 2

Hegel argues in the preface to the Philosophy of Right that "every
individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time
apprehended in thoughts." "It is just as absurd," he maintains, "to
fancy [the German word is einbilden: imagine, presume] that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an
individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes." 3 This is a
hard saying. It suggests that "'[t]here is not one of our ideas or one
of our reflexions which does not carry a date.' " 4 The fact that a given
philosophical project has a date does not, of course, mean that it is
necessarily (out)dated. Nonetheless, if Hegel is right, if a philosophy
is always already bound to its own time, we must squarely face the
obstacles which stand in the way of the project undertaken in these
pages: an examination of Hegel's relevance for the theory and practice
of law in the twentieth century.
Several questions seem pertinent to our purpose: Can we expect
to shed light on problems in contemporary legal theory and practice
through analysis of the work of a man for whom the dependence of
thought on the particular socio-historical conditions of its production
was axiomatic? Can an audience of late twentieth century, (primarily) English-speaking American scholars hope meaningfully to trans• Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University in the City of New York. B.A., 1978,
Yale College; J.D., 1982, Yale Law School.
1 W. Kauffman, Hegel: A Reinterpretation 49 (1978).
2 1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 370 (1945).
3 G. Hegel, Philosophy of Right preface, at 11 (T. Knox trans. 1952) (1821) [hereinafter
Philosophy of Right].
4 M. Westphal, History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology 44 (1978) (quoting MerleauPonty, The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays 41 (J. Edie ed. 1964)).
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late the work of an early nineteenth-century German who described
his project as an attempt to teach philosophy to speak in his native
tongue? Given the difficulty of translation-both as a methodological
and philosophical problem-is an effort to make (Hegel's) German
speak in (our) English doomed to end in aporetic babble? 5 Have we
any reason, in short, to believe that we can supersede or leap over
(overleap) the temporal, socio-cultural, and linguistic distance which
separates us from Hegel? These questions are not merely rhetorical.
To view them as such would be to foreclose any prospect of opening
up Hegel's texts beyond their nineteenth-century European provenance. For my part, any serious engagement with Hegelian dialectical method in our time and place must take these questions seriously.
This brings me to a separate, but related introductory point. Not
only must we remain alert to the historical context in which Hegel
wrote, and to which his oeuvre was an attempt to respond; but we
must also resist the temptation of thinking that we can safely isolate
and examine any one fragment of his work apart from a philosophical
system which is, in an important sense, an indivisible whole. It has
been remarked that any "attempt to do justice [even] to the most random observation of Hegel ends up drawing the whole tangled, dripping mass of the Hegelian sequence of forms out into the light with
it." 6 The difficulty of reading and writing about Hegelian philosophy
is a function of "its holistic, 'totalizing' character: as though you
could not say any one thing until you had first said everything; as
though with each new idea you were bound to recapitulate the entire
system." 7 ·so it is with the dialectics of the Phenomenology of Spirit:
one is continually surprised by the way in which any one episode in
Hegel's narrative ·of the progress of consciousness incorporates all
that has come before it, and anticipates all that is to follow. We must
be mindful, at each laborious step of the way, of the dense, structured
heterogeneity of Hegel's dialectical constructs. In the context of the
5 Consider, for example, the difficulty one faces in translating the German aujhebung (and
its variants). This is a (perhaps the) key word in the Hegelian lexicon, and yet one for which
we really have no corresponding term. As Jacques Derrida puts it, the word wields an "untranslatable privilege." J. Derrida, From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism
Without Reserve, in Writing and Difference 251,257 (A. Bass trans. 1978). The word has" 'a
two-fold meaning in the [German] language: on the one hand, it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. . . . Thus what is sublated is
at the same time preserved, it has lost its immediacy only but it is not on that account annihilated.'" R. Plant, Hegel 143 (1983) (quoting 4 G. Hegel, Samtliche Werke 120 (H. Glockner
ed. 1927-1930)). These problems, moreover, are compounded by the fact that Hegel frequently
deploys already polyvalent German terms to carry distinctive (Hegelian) meanings within his
philosophical system.
6 F. Jameson, Marxism and Form 306 (1971).
7 Id.
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Phenomenology of Spirit, this demands that our reading of any one

moment in the text must be guided by an awareness that it bears the
imprint of its tensed, constitutive relation to other passages whichparadoxically-are present even in their absence.
Taken together, these two observations regarding the historical
and philosophical context in which Hegel must be situated inform the
point of view from which I will now approach the paper by Professor
Guyora Binder.
I.

HISTORY OF AFRICAN SLAVERY IN AMERICA

"Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation" stages itself as a synthesis
of Hegelian categories and the history of African slavery in America.
The essay is an example of the possibilities, and the problems with
which such a project is frought. My aim in the next few pages is in
part critical and in part to clarify. I first identify and then attempt to
show the limits of what I take to be the key claim of Professor
Binder's paper.
I start from the premise that the history of mastery and slavery
in America to which Binder attempts to apply Hegelian philosophy
has its own immanent specificity. This history, as I will show, is not
reducible to Hegel's philosophical reflections in the Phenomenology of
Spirit on the struggle for recognition between the master and slave; to
elide the two (which in this case means to ignore their irreducible
asymmetry) is to do violence to both.
Nothing in my argument here, however, should be read as a case
for the wholesale rejection of the Phenomenology as a source of critical insight into this or any other episode in the history of African
people in America. To the contrary, my claim is instead more narrow-although it does carry broad implications for a contemporary
practice of Hegelian legal theory in America. In my view, the inadequacy of the reading offered by Professor Binder does not lie in the
tum to the Phenomenology of Spirit as such. My objections, rather,
flow from the aforementioned importance in Hegelian interpretation
of historical and philosophical context.
Before developing these objections, let us first examine Professor
Binder's key claim. The heart of his paper is the section entitled "The
Masters Mastered: How the Slaves Civilized the South." In this section, Professor Binder seeks to show that notions of honor, gallantry,
and genteel sociability embraced by the Southern master class had
their origin in timocratic values brought by enslaved Africans to the
Americas. This was so because, as between the two, the slaves were
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"more likely than their masters to exemplify timocratic values. " 8
Over time, argues Binder, slaveholders became psychologically dependent on their slaves for the form and substance of the aristocratic
ethos which structured social and political intercourse in the South.
The superordinate master class, by way of a process of dialectical reversal, found itself enchained by its psychic investment in what the
subordinate slave class thought of it.
Professor Binder's account of the ways in which slaves civilized
their masters comes perilously close to supporting an inference that
(1) the psychic and social costs incurred in the operation of this symbolic economy of honor were negligible (for masters and slaves alike),
and/or that (2) on balance, the benefits in any event outweighed the
attendant burdens. It is true, writes Professor Binder, that the timocratic values the slaves brought with them from Africa were "distorted" in the behavior of their American masters, and "purchased at
the price of others' freedom and dignity." 9 Nonetheless, we are told,
the slaves saw themselves in some sense reflected in their aristocratic
masters; they could (and did) take pride in the success of their tutelary project, secure in the knowledge that the timocratic manners of
their masters "were the values of the slaves, who understood that
their freedom could never be achieved by individual escape." 10
Several remarks are in order here. Although my observations are
primarily historical, I am concerned not only with the accuracy of
Professor Binder's account, but also with the limits (and unrealized
potential) of the Hegelian framework in which his interpretation is
cast. My first broad point is that a closer look at the available evidence paints a much darker, violent picture of master-slave relations
than that drawn by Binder. In an earlier section of his paper, Professor Binder observes that slavery in the West "always involved massive, sustained politicide by one culture against another."" What
Professor Binder fails to mention in his discussion of the dialectic of
the Southern "civilizing process" 12 is the degree to which the system8

Binder, Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1435, 1473 (1989).
Id. at 1475.
Id.
11 Id. at 1441.
12 This is the title of the first in an important series of studies in the history of manners by
Norbert Elias. See N. Elias, The Civilizing Process (E. Jephcott trans. 1982); N. Elias, Power
and Civility (E. Jephcott trans. 1982) [hereinafter N. Elias, Power]. One pertinent theme developed in Elias's genealogy of Western manners is the way in which the "monopolization of
physical force" (first embodied in the large princely or royal court) leads to the establishment
of "pacified social spaces." These spaces become the site for that separation of physical and
non-physical violence which is a decisive moment in the emergence of modem "civilized"
society. The important point to note for our purpose is Elias's claim that this separation inau9
10
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atic brutality is responsible for the establishment of Western slavery
accounts as well for its continuation. In a word, the story of civilization in the American South is incomplete without an account of the
brutal, often bloody incivility to which it stood in uneasy but unavoidable affinity.
To grasp the violent underside of that society, one has only to
attend to records left by those who lived in it. A comprehensive review of life in the antebellum South is of course beyond the scope of
this Paper. However, even a cursory examination of that recorded
experience (of slaves and masters alike) should indicate the poverty of
a culture in which the freedom and honor so valued by one people
could be bought only through the enslavement and degradation of
another. 13 John Blassingame has noted the all too frequent impulse of
the historian to dismiss slaves' portraits of life in the antebellum
South as too harsh and exaggerated. "There is, however, a great deal
of evidence in antebellum court records, newspapers, memoirs, and
plantation diaries which suggests that this is not the case." 14 The
treatment slaves suffered at the hands of the most sadistic masters was
limited only by the imagination:
On the plantations of these masters, strong black men suffered
from overwork, abuse, and starvation; and the overseer's horn usually sounded before sleep could chase the fatigue of the last day's
labor. Characteristically, stocks closed on hapless women and
children, mothers cried for the infants tom cruelly from their
arms, and whimpering black women fought vainly to preserve their
virtue in the face of the lash or pleaded for mercy while blood
flowed from their bare buttocks. A cacophony of horrendous
sounds constantly reverberated throughout such plantations: nauseated black men vomited while strung up over slowly burning tobacco leaves, vicious dogs tore black flesh, black men moaned as
they were hung up by the thumbs with the whip raising deep welts
gurates a coincident functional transformation: forms of nonphysical (e.g., economic compulsion) violence emerge, which become the primary vehicle of social control. This displacement
renders possible a "civilizing" change of behavior whose distinctive feature is the internalization of constraints rather than their external imposition. N. Elias, Power, supra, at 234-43.
There can be no doubt that African slavery in the American South was marked from its
inception and throughout its existence by fusion of physical and nonphysical violence. In
terms of Elias's analysis, then, we might say that the antebellum South never truly achieved
the civilized ideal toward which it aspired: behind its forms of civility lay a substantive
incivility.
13 My description here of the workings of the economy of honor in the slaveholding South
echoes Hegel's arguments in the Philosophy of Right on the dialectic of wealth and poverty in
modem civil society. For a detailed exposition of Hegel's views, see S. Avineri, Hegel's Theory
of the Modem State 148-54 (1972).
14 J. Blassingame, The Slave Community 163 (1972).

a
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on their backs and as they were bent over barrels or tied down to
stakes while paddles with holes in them broke blisters on their
rumps. Frequently blacks called God's name in vain as they had
fainted from their master's hundredth stroke or as they had their
brains blown out. 15
Blassingame patiently documents the extent to which "even the
most cultured of planters" became "inured to brutality": 16
[M]asters frequently kicked, slapped, cuffed, or boxed the ears of
domestic servants, sometimes flogged pregnant women, and often
punished slaves so cruelly that it took them weeks to recover.
Many slaves reported that they were flogged severely, had iron
weights with bells on them placed on their necks, or were shackled.
Recalcitrant slaves received more stripes and were treated more
cruelly by exasperated planters than were any other blacks. Moses
Roper, an incorrigible runaway, regularly received 100 to 200
lashes from his owner. Once his master poured tar on his heap and
set it afire. On another occasion, after Roper had escaped from leg
irons, his master had the nails on his fingers and toes beaten off. 17
While it is true some slaveholders felt constrained by " 'noblesse
oblige'" to" 'treat kindly the class dependent on [them],' " 18 the record suggests that there were many others who "branded, stabbed,
tarred and feathered, burned, shackled, tortured, maimed, crippled,
mutilated, and castrated their slaves." 19
The fundamental hypocrisy of their honorable masters was not
lost on the slaves. Consider, for example, the language of the following account of an ex-slave:
When he go to sell a slave, he feed that one good for a few days,
then when he goes to put 'em up on the auction block he takes a
meat skin and greases all round that nigger's mouth and makes 'em
look like they been eating plenty meat and such like and was good
and strong and able to work. Sometimes he sell all the babes from
the breast, and then again he sell the mothers from the babes and
the husbands and the wives, and so on. He wouldn't let 'em holler
much when the folks be sold away. He say, "I have you whupped
if you don't hush." They sure loved their six children though.
They wouldn't want nobody buying them. 20
Id.
Id.
17 Id. at 162 (footnote omitted).
18 Id. at 164 (citing A. Washington, How Beauty Was Saved 64 (1907)) (emphasis
omitted).
19 Id. at 163-64.
20 In Their Own Words: A History of the American Negro 1619-1865, at 177 (M. Meltzer
ed. 1964).
.
15

16
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The contradiction between the ideal of civility and its embodied
absence in their violent treatment of slaves made the masters an object
not only of fear, but of deep-seated loathing. This contempt was directed not only toward masters, but to all who belonged to the masters' race. As Blassingame notes, since "every white man considered
himself the slave's policeman," 21 blacks were also routinely subjected
to malicious mistreatment even by those who owned no slaves. It is
not surprising, then, that most slaves were disdainful not only of their
own masters: they "hated and were suspicious of all whites." 22 William Wells Brown, a fugitive slave, wrote that the slave's attitude toward European-Americans was shaped from childhood. "'The
slave,'" Brown wrote," 'is brought up to look upon every white man
as an enemy to him and his race.' ' 123
The enmity of the enslaved Africans toward their masters took
many forms. In most instances, the contempt in which slaves held
those to whom they were so brutally subjugated could find only mediate expression. Reviewing the record, one is struck by their ingenuity.
Disaffected slaves continually struck back at the point of production:
by slowing down their work, riding their masters' mules and horses to
death, and stealing and sabotaging their masters' property, African
slaves forged an effective arsenal of devices with which to register
their discontent in ways which directly injured the slaveholders' material interests. 24
More often than not, a slave might find it equally effective to
show disdain for a master in a more muted, but no less meaningful
manner. This brings me to my second broad criticism of Professor
Binder's account. In developing the argument that "slaves provided
their masters with models of gentility, community, and honor," 25 Professor Binder cites several instances of slave conduct which were expressive of the Southern aristocratic ethos. In his view, these
examples provide persuasive evidence of the African slaves' esteem for
timocratic values, and their admiration for the ways in which these
values were embodied in their masters. The historical record, however, suggests that things were not always what they seemed. There is
a deeper, darker meaning in much of this behavior that Binder simply
misses. In the first place, one must not forget that when staged in the
context of the slaves' dealings with slaveholders (not to mention other
J. Blassingame, supra note 14, at 162.
Id. at 209.
23 Id. (quoting W. Brown, Narrative of William W. Brown, A Fugitive Slave 95-96 (1847)).
24 See id. at 211.
2s Binder, supra note 8, at 1475.
21
22
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whites), the ritual of civility was always also a ritual of (coerced) deference: in the antebellum South social intercourse between slaves and
members of the master class always reflected the reality of underlying
power relations of domination and subordination. The slave of course
knew that a bad performance in this deferential play of good manners
was to be avoided at all costs. Put bluntly, the slave who failed or
refused to act deferentially in the presence of whites would almost
certainly be slapped, kicked, flogged, or otherwise humiliated. 26 This
being the case, where Binder sees only esteem and admiration on the
part of slaves for the forms of Southern civility, we are in fact confronted with attitudes that were considerably more ambivalent and
complex.
In sketching an alternative account here of the ritual of civility as
a concurrent ritual of deference, the historical work of John Blassingame may again be of some assistance. Adopting the sociological
framework of Erving Goffman and others on symbolic interaction between superordinates and subordinates, Blassingame contends that
rituals of deference often reveal a structure of deception. "[R]ituals of
deference are fleeting, highly formalized, almost unconscious acts
which are often performed without too much psychological cost to
the subordinate." 27 This is particularly true where the subordinate is
able effectively to:
feign respect through the ritual of deference in spite of his low
opinion of the superordinate. The subordinate is able to practice
this deception because.the superordinate frequently demands submission and deferential behavior more for an audience than for
himself. For this reason, and often to maintain his belief in himself
as a person worthy of respect, the superordinate may read more
into a deferential act than the subordinate means to convey (misperception) or overlook minor lapses (selective inattention) in the
submissive role played by the subordinate. Taking advantage of
the superordinate's misperception, the subordinate may overact,
being very submissive and deferential, to deceive or to show his
inner contempt for the superordinate and to preserve his own
autonomy. 28

Applying this theoretical model to the history of African slavery in
America, Blassingame argues that "many of the slaves recognized the
26 Following the anthropologist Pierre Bordieu, we might say that in the culture of the
antebellum South, the "concessions of politeness" on the part of slaves toward members of the
master class (slaveowners or not) "always contain[ed] political concessions." P. Bordieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 95 (1977).
21 J. Blassingame, supra note 14, at 189.
28 Id. at 188 (footnote omitted).
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customary deferential act for what it was, a ritual. It was so customary for many of them that they thought little about it. Since it was a
habitual mode of behavior, many did not view the deferential act as a
symbol of their degradation. " 29
Obviously, analysis of the culture of civility within this critical
framework would tend considerably to blunt the edge of Professor
Binder's interpretation. I would suggest that the genteel manners embodied in the conduct of the slave (which he rather unproblematically
views as "models of gentility") might alternatively and more significantly be seen in another light. There is no doubt that for many African slaves, one consequence of life as personal chattel was the
emergence of what can only be described as a form of bicameral consciousness. As the little ditty sung for generations put it:
Got one mind for white folks to see,
'Nother for what I know is me;
He don't know, he don't know my mind. 30

The experience of servitude quickly taught the African slaves the
value of a nimble, double mind. To hold on to a sense of human
dignity that was constantly under assault, the slaves had to split themselves up psychically into two selves, "one mind for white folks to see,
'[n]other for what I know is me." 31 One contemporary account, noting the " 'inevitable tendency of servitude ... to make a slave a hypocrite toward the white man,'" concluded that "'[i]f you approach
him [the slave] from the stand-point of authority, you will never get
an insight into his real character. He is exceedingly shrewd.' " 32
Professor Binder's interpretation of the meanings and uses of
Southern civility for the slave is underwritten by a thin. and (as we
have seen) historically inaccurate model of the latter's rich interior
life. Working with too simple an understanding of the psychic makeup of the African slave, Professor Binder takes the deferential ritual at
face value: he erroneously assumes that the slaves meant (and were)
what they said and did. 33 The historical record, however, tells us that
Id. at 204.
L. Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness xiii (1977).
31 Id.
32 L. Levine, supra note 30, at 100 (quoting J. Long, Pictures of Slavery 196 (1857)) (These
words are by John Dixon Long, a Methodist minister. In 1856, Long's commitment to abolition led him to leave Maryland for Pennsylvania.).
33 There is some warrant in the Phenomenology for equating the act with the person, but
Professor Binder does not evoke it in support of his implicit position. I am thinking of the
passage in the fifth chapter on Physiognomy and Phrenology, in which Hegel maintains that
the individual is "what he [sic] has done." It reads in pertinent part:
The true being of a man is ... his deed.... (The] deed ... does away with the
inexpressibility of what is "meant", in respect of the self-conscious individuality.
29
30
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there was often a significant and subversive difference between the
two: the appearance of the thing did not always correspond to its reality. History suggests that for the slaves, the real merit of the forms of
honor and civility so highly credited by their owners probably lay in
their value as (trick) "mirrors" that they could strategically use to
distort and disfigure the masters' mannered self-image. As one exslave recalled:
Us slaves watched white folks' parties where the guests danced a
minuet and then paraded in a grand march, with the ladies and
gentlemen going different ways and then meeting again, arm in
arm, and marching down the center together. Then we'd do it,
too, but we used to mock 'em, every step. 34

In contrast to the reading offered by Binder, one might argue that the
slaves found a satirical language in these vaunted codes of proper conduct with which to mock the authority of their masters. Using the
forms of etiquette and gallantry so venerated by the master class, the
slaves played out a black "comedy of manners" in which they had the
last laugh on those to whom they outwardly deferred, but inwardly
despised. 35 Through a process of strategic reversal and semantic displacement, the African slaves protected their integrity, altering the
inner content of Southern gentility even as they appeared to embrace
its external forms.
This perspective, I believe, provides a richer interpretation of the
In such mere opinion the individuality is infinitely determined and determinable.
In the accomplished deed this spurious infinity is destroyed. The deed is something simply determined, universal, to be grasped in the abstraction; it is murder,
theft, or a good action, a brave deed, and so on, and what it is can be said of it. It
is this, and its being is not merely a sign, but the fact itself. It is this, and the
individual human being is what the deed is. In the simplicity of this being, the
individual is for others a universal being who really is, and who ceases to be something only "meant" .... [W]hen his performance and his inner possibility, capacity or intention are contrasted, it is the former alone which is to be regarded as his
true actuality, even if he deceives himself on the point, and, turning away from his
action into himself, fancies that in this inner self he is something else than what he
is in the deed.
G. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit paras. 310, 322 (A. Miller trans. 1977) (1807) [hereinafter
Phenomenology of Spirit]. It should be clear from my argument that Hegel's view of the
matter does not square with the facts of life under American slavery.
34 L. Levine, supra note 30, at 17 (quoting M. & J. Steams, Jazz Dance: The Story of
American Vernacular Dance 22 (1968)). Levine also describes slave cakewalks in Tennessee,
in which the slaves " 'did a take-off on the high manners of the white folks in the 'big house,'
but their masters, who gathered around to watch the fun, missed the point.'" Id. (quoting R.
Blesh & H. Janis, They All Played Ragtime 96 (1971)).
35 Indeed, at least one source suggests that it did not pay to embrace the forms of civility
too closely. " 'I was once whipped,' a freedman in New Orleans told David Macrae, 'because I
said to missis, "My mother sent me." We were not allowed to call our mammies "mother.'' It
made it come too near the way of the white folks.'" L. Levine, supra note 30, at 139.
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"ritual of respect" than is possible within the perspective of Professor
Binder's account. Its greater analytic yield can be attributed in part
to the fact that, unlike Professor Binder's account, it is sensitive to the
percipient "twoness" (as Du Bois later called it) of the slave, whose
survival depended on the development of a double consciousness:
"Those white folks made us lie. We had to lie to live." 36 Heeding the
testimony of a former slave that duplicity and dissimulation were almost always mediate links in the chain·s which bound slave to master,
this alternative account reveals another picture of the "well-mannered
slave." Behind the mask of servile respect and admiration that Binder
draws in his reading of the dialectic of civility, we had better look for
another image: the hidden face of the slave's deep revulsion for the
master, and for the cruel, cultured way of life for which the master
stood. 37
A third vital point concerns a troubling assertion Binder makes
about the meaning for the slave of the relationship between flight and
freedom. In explaining his thesis on the civilizing role the slaves
played in the life of the antebellum South, Binder contends that slaves
"cultivated" the ties that bound them to their owners in large measure
because they knew that_ "their freedom could never be achieved by
individual escape." 38 Binder is correct if this statement is meant to be
interpreted as making a rather uncontroversial claim regarding the
uncertain status of liberty for Afro-Americans during the antebellum
period. It is certainly true that in a society in which Africans were
bought and sold, anyone with black skin was vulnerable. Indeed,
there are many recorded instances in which lawfully manumitted
slaves (as well as blacks who had been free from birth) were kidnapped into slavery.
However, I take Binder to be making two stronger, more problematic claims. Binder seems to be saying, first, that African slaves
did not view individual escape as an effective way to secure freedom
(however precarious it might be). Second, Binder appears to believe
Id. at 123.
In many instances, the profound contempt in which their slaves held them was a reality
of which slaveholders were aware, but which they could not bring themselves to acknowledge.
As Blassingame writes:
Planters insisted that their slaves show no signs of dissatisfaction. Instead, they
were to demonstrate their humility by cheerful performance of their tasks. Elizabeth Keckley's master, for instance, "never liked to see one of his slaves wear a
sorrowful face, and those who offended in this particular way were always punished." Anxiously scanning the faces of his slaves, the master made them reflect,
in their countenances, what he wanted rather than what they felt.
J. Blassingame, supra note 14, at 161 (quoting E. Keckley, Behind the Scenes 29 (1868)).
38 Binder, supra note 8, at 1475.
36
37
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that Africans in America did not and could not conceive of freedom
in an individualistic sense. His argument, it would seem, is that the
idea of freedom always and only had meaning for Afro-Americans
under slavery in terms of the collective. Unfortunately, Binder is
wrong on both counts.
0, that I were free! . . . 0, why was I born a man, of whom to
make a brute! I am left in the hottest hell of unending slavery. 0,
God, save me! God deliver me! Let me be free! Is there any God?
Why am I a slave? I will run away. I will not stand it. Get
caught, or get clear, I'll try it. . . . I have only one life to lose. I
had as well be killed running as die standing. 39

This passage is from the writings of the escaped slave Frederick
Douglass. It is just one of a number of instances in the extant literature in which enslaved Africans articulate their desire for freedom,
and the way in which they would seek it in individualist terms. 40 One
has only to consult the "overwhelming evidence ... of the [African
slaves'] undying love for freedom," 41 moreover, to see that individual
escape was the primary means through which African slaves sought
to achieve an independence that was (again) conceived first and primarily in individual terms. In a survey by Marion J. Russell of
"American Slave Discontent in Records of the High Courts," cases
involving runaways constitute the largest single category. 42 This is
not to suggest that the claims of community never figured into the
decision to escape. One of the reasons the bid for freedom was never
lightly taken lay precisely in its communal implications. As Frederick Douglass wrote in his Life and Times, the slave who chose to
escape to freedom was choosing irrevocable separation from the only
community that she had ever known. "It is my opinion that
thousands more would have escaped from slavery but for the strong
affection which bound them to their families, relatives, and friends." 43
In addition to the pain of leaving the only community she had ever
known, the slave had always to consider the horrible consequences of
failure: recaptured slaves were tortured, imprisoned, or sold to plantations in the deep South. Nonetheless, the fact that so many African
39

J. Blassingame, supra note 14, at 104 (quoting Frederick Douglass).
The attentive reader will also note that, for Douglass, freedom is a prize for which he is
willing to risk his very life. Like many slaves, Douglass chose escape because he considered a
life of unending bondage not worth living. Suffice it to say that Douglass's account is only one
of the many slave autobiographies in which the actual historical experience of slavery resists
interpretation derived from Hegelian philosophical categories.
41 J. Blassingame, supra note 14, at 104.
42 Id. at 108 (citing Russell, American Slave Discontent in Records of the High Courts, 31
Journal of Negro History 411-34 (1946)).
43 F. Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass 193 (1962).
40
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slaves decided to escape and face the unpredictable risks of a solitary
existence in a hostile society should caution us against a generalization that they did not consider even an uncertain, individual freedom
preferable to the "hell" (as Douglass put it) of collective servitude.

II.

PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF MASTER AND SLAVE

My observations thus far have focused on what I have argued are
distortions of the historical record in the account of mastery and slavery offered by Professor Binder. I want now to address the question
of the interpretive framework in which that historical account is cast:
a certain truncated reading of Hegel's philosophical narrative of
master and slave. In the section of his comment toward which I have
directed my critical remarks, Professor Binder makes no explicit reference to the text of Phenomenology on the struggle for recognition
between the master and slave. Nonetheless, one can still discern the
effects of his appropriation of Hegel's philosophical allegory on the
drift of Binder's genealogy which, unlike Hegel's narrative, sets forth
a number of concrete historical claims about an actual state of (material and mental) affairs in a particular society at a specific moment in
time.
Paraphrasing Hegel, one might summarize the essential thrust of
Professor Binder's interpretation of mastery and slavery in the antebellum South in the following formulation: The "truth" of the master
class's gallant consciousness was the servile consciousness of the Africans whom they had enslaved. As Binder puts it in an earlier part of
his paper, "'[s]lavery provided the social setting that permitted the
imagination of a [genteel] "community," both for masters and
slaves.' " 44 It may well be that the Hegelian paradigm permits acertain insight into the cunning of illiterate African slaves who turned
the tables on their American owners, mastering the masters through a
dialectic of control over the civilizing process of the South. In "Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation," however, the payment exacted for
this insight is a troubling analytic blindness. This shortcoming can be
traced in part to Professor Binder's misreading of the historical record, whose contours I have already sketched.
The limits of Binder's analysis can also be traced to the way in
which he seeks to appropriate the Hegelian text. At the end of the
paper, Binder· describes his project as an effort "to detach [Hegel]
from his own past and apply him to our future." 45 I am not quite
44 Binder, supra note 8, at 1461 (quoting K. Greenberg, Masters and Statesmen: The Political Culture of American Slavery 84 (1985)).
4 5 Id. at 1480.
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clear what this means, but I believe the program being urged here can
be characterized as an attempt-through the force of a conceptual
time-warp-to yank Hegel out of his "present" into our own. This
self-described method, I submit, is misguided on two accounts. First,
it disregards the degree to which the Phenomenology (like the rest of
Hegel) is conditioned and circumscribed by its historical context. Second, this strategy overestimates the extent to which any one part of
the Phenomenology-especially Hegel's allegory of mastery and slavery-can be intelligibly severed from the philosophical text that underwrites it.
The attempted "detachment" of Hegel from his "past" shows little appreciation of the fact that Hegel understood all his philosophical
categories to be historically conditioned: "Hegel seems more aware
than any other philosopher, before him or since, of the contextual
dependencies of philosophy as an 'expression of the spirit of its
times.' " 46 For Hegel, the task of philosophical thought was to remember and rigorously reflect its essential historicity. Philosophy,
writes Hegel in the passage quoted above from the Philosophy of
Right, "is its own time apprehended in thoughts." 47 This emphasis on
the historical situatedness of the philosopher-and of philosophical
thought itself-is echoed in Lectures on the History of Philosophy:
"No man can overleap his time, the spirit of his time is his spirit also;
but the point [of philosophy] is, to recognize that spirit by its
content. " 48
Nowhere is the constitutive relation between Hegelian philosophy and the historical circumstances of its production clearer than in
the conclusion to a lecture Hegel delivered while writing the Phenomenology of Spirit.
This, Gentleman, is speculative philosophy as far as I have been
able to construct it. Look upon it as the beginnings of the philosophy which you will carry forward. We find ourselves in an important epoch in world history, in a ferment, when spirit has taken a
leap forward, where it has sloughed off its old form and is acquiring a new one. The whole mass of existing ideas and concepts, the
very bonds of the world have fallen apart and dissolved like a
dream. A new product of the spirit is being prepared. The chief
task of philosophy is to welcome it and grant it recognition. 49
46

R. Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel 179 (1983).
Philosophy of Right, supra note 3, preface at 11.
4 8 2 G. Hegel, History of Philosophy 96 (E. Haldane & F. Simson trans. 1894)) [hereinafter
History of Philosophy].
49 G. Lukacs, The Young Hegel 454 (R. Livingston trans. 1975).
47
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Here Hegel anticipates his prefatory argument in the Phenomenology
that "ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era":
Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and
imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the
labour of its own transformation. . . . [J]ust as the first breath
drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth-there is a qualitative leap,
and the child is born-so likewise the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the
structure of its previous world, whose tottering state is only hinted
at by isolated symptoms. The frivolity and boredom which unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The gradual
crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a
sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new
world. 50

Clearly the lesson to be drawn from these passages is that, for the
Hegel of the Phenomenology, the only appropriate object of a philosopher is his present. 51 In light of Hegel's insistence that "no one can
coherently describe or imagine a society which is radically different
from any with which he is acquainted," 52 there is simply no warrant
for the notion that we can wrest Hegel from his past in an effort to
illuminate our present, our future, or our past. 53 To my mind, our
so Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 11.
51

In time, Hegel's radically revised views on the relation between his philosophy and the
present were to become even more cautious. After the fall of the Napoleonic regime whose rise
he had read as the sign of a new historical beginning after the turmoil of the French Revolution, Hegel came to doubt whether philosophy was capable of anything more than after the
fact understanding:
One more word about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of
the world, it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its
process of formation has been completed. The teaching of the concept, which is
also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the
ideal first appears over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this same real
world in' its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual
realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old.
By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The
owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.
Philosophy of Right, supra note 3, preface, at 12-13. "In the [Phenomenology]," writes
Lukacs, "[Hegel] speaks of the dawn, in the [Philosophy of Right], of the dusk; the birth of a
new epoch in the first case, the end of an era of human history in the second." G. Lukacs,
supra note 49, at 456 (emphasis in original).
52 Inwood, Hegel, Plato and Greek 'Sittlichkeit,' in The State and Civil Society: Studies in
Hegel's Political Philosophy, 40, 48 (Z. Pelczynski ed. 1984).
53 Early on in his paper, Professor Binder asserts that Hegel's account of the struggle for
recognition between the master and the slave (or more properly, the lord and bondsman) is not
a concrete "analysis of actual slave societies,'' but rather a "state of nature argument." Binder,
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contemporary appropriation of Hegelian concepts for the historical
study of African slavery in America cannot simply refuse the limiting
implications of the constitutive historicity that Hegel imposed on
himself. From Hegel's perspective, "'America [was] clearly the land
of the future, [a land] still in the process of becoming.' " 54 Ever aware
of the limits of prediction and projection, Hegel disclaimed any competence to address the subject of American society: "'[A]s a land of
the future, it has no interest for us here, for, as regards history, our
concern must be with that which has been and that which is.' " 55
This same sense of historical constraint governs both Hegel's reflections on the struggle between master and slave, and the speculative
project of the Phenomenology as a whole. It must be reckoned into
our reception of Hegel today.
"Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation" compounds the historical
problem in a second, equally misguided move. Professor Binder
unwisely wrenches the story of the master and the slave from its
richer generative (conceptual) context. Georges Bataille teaches that
"'Hegel's thoughts are interdependent to the point of its being impos-.
sible to grasp their meaning, if not in the necessity of the [larger]
movement which constitutes their coherence.' " 56 In unpacking the
allegory of the fight to the death for recognition between master and
slave, then, we must remain rigorously alert in our reading to the narrative framework in which Hegel situates what, standing alone, is
only one (rather abstract) link in a larger conceptual chain. Put another way, one can say that the master-slave dialectic is only one extended metaphor in a work that can be described as a "string of
metaphors." 57 Binder is troublingly indifferent to the phenomenologisupra note 8, at 1435. I would question this characterization of the allegory. It is, after all,
inserted in a presentation of the "immanent history of human experience," H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory 94 ( 1960), or in the words of George
Kelly, a "record of the spirit's efforts to attain peace in the knowledge that there is nothing
outside itself." G. Kelly, Hegel's Retreat From Eleusis 39 (1978). In any case, it matters little
if we provisionally accept the claim about the purely conceptual status of the master-slave
narrative. The fact remains that it is articulated ~ithin a radically historicized system. Moreover, when Hegel next takes up the relation between bondsman and lord (in the discussion of
noble and ignoble consciousness in the sixth chapter) his reflections are unquestionably historical: he examines its unfolding under the ancien regime. See A. Prior, Revolution and Philosophy: The Significance of the French Revolution for Hegel and Marx 65-67 (1972).
54 S. Avineri, supra note 13, at 236 (quoting Hegel).
5 5 Id. (quoting History of Philosophy, supra note 48).
56 This quotation, from G. Bataille, L'experience interieure 193 (1943), is taken from J.
Derrida, supra note S, 11t 253. Joseph Flay puts the point more pithily: "Any attempt to
interpret a single section of a philosophical work is beset with difficulties. In the case of Hegel,
it verges on insanity." Flay, Hegel's "Inverted World," 23 Rev. of Metaphysics 662, 663
(1970).
s1 H. Sussman, The Hegelian Aftermath 18 (1982).
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cal context· in which this metaphor appears. As a consequence, he
neglects interpretive possibilities suggested even by a cursory survey
of the discursive landscape that surrounds this dialectical moment.
To be sure, the Phenomenology throws up powerful obstacles in
the way of any attempt to interpret the concrete historical record of
African slavery in America in light of an Hegelian perspective.
Hegel's abstract model of the struggle for recognition between lord
and bondsman cannot and was not meant to serve as a "readymade,"58 analytic framework within which to understand the mastery
and slavery in the American South. Part of the difficulty, then, can be
laid to the internal problem of the Hegelian narrative itself.
Two obvious objections to the use of Hegel for the study of African slavery in America have been developed in the Marxist literature
on this section of the Phenomenology. From the Marxist perspective,
the Hegelian account is defective on two counts. First, it views the
relation between master and slave primarily as the interaction of two
consciousnesses. "[Hegel] ignores the material reality of oppression.
Quite obviously, oppressive social relations cannot be adequately explained unless they are seen as rooted in the physical domination of
some men by others." 59 This view of the master-slave relation as a
relation between consciousnesses leads to a second inadequacy in
Hegel's account of the conflict whose outcome establishes that relation. In seeing the struggle for recognition as a battle between competing consciousnesses, Hegel "ignores its foundation in the relations
of material production, that is, in the ways in which [human beings]
are related within a society organised for the satisfaction of physical
needs." 60 Hegel's conceptual dialectic is concerned with the idea of
mastery and slavery, with the idea of the life and death struggle for
social recognition-not with their concrete actuality.
My earlier historical criticisms were intended, in part, to bring
home the harsh physical reality of life under the peculiar institution.
We saw there that the genteel pomp and circumstance in which Professor Binder sites the Southern communitarian ethos was complexly
plaited with a bloody reality of pain, suffering, and death. Much the
same relation held between the Southern ideology of gentility and the
slave-based wealth to which the genteel planter· class owed the material conditions of its communitarian possibility. To paraphrase Eric
Williams, African slavery was first and primarily a matter of economics, not ideology.
58

59
60

Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 33.
R. Norman, Hegel's Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction 55 (1976).
Id.
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"Odious resource" though it might be, as Mervale called it, slavery
was an economic institution of the first importance. It had been
the basis of Greek economy and had built up the Roman Empire.
In modem times it provided the sugar for the tea and the coffee
cups of the Westem world. It produced the cotton to serve as a
base for modem capitalism. It made the American South and the
Caribbean islands. Seen in historical perspective, it forms a part of
that general picture of the harsh treatment of the underprivileged
classes, the unsympathetic poor laws and severe feudal laws, and
the indifference with which the rising capitalist class was "beginning to reckon prosperity in terms of pounds sterling, and ... becoming used to the idea of sacrificing human life to the deity of
increased production."
Adam Smith, the intellectual champion of the industrial middle class with its new-found doctrine of freedom, later propagated
the argument that it was, in general, pride and love of power in the
master that led to slavery ....
. . . [But] [t]he reasons for slavery, wrote Gibbon Wakefield,
"are not moral, but economical circumstances; they relate not to
vice and virtue, but to production." 61

Williams's analysis suggests that one simply cannot expect to understand the moral economy of African slavery in the Americas apart
from the political economy that gave it its material infrastructure.
The history of American slavery is a history of both moral and material (physical and economic) dimension.
Standing alone, Hegel's philosophical account of mastery and
slavery is a defective lens through which to view the historical institution of that relation in American society: 62 its horizon is limited by a
singular focus on the ideal character of lordship and bondage. Accordingly, an analysis of American slavery which uncritically follows
the interpretive strategy set forth in the Hegelian account will obscure
much more of the material conditions and practices of that institution
E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery 5-6 (1944) (footnotes omitted).
One can read the fourth section of Professor Binder's paper on "The Internal Contradictions of Independence" as an implicit concession of the need for a materialist analysis of the
interconnection between the ideology of freedom and the Southern slave-based economy. The
insights of this part of his analysis, however, are never reckoned into the larger body of his
paper. Instead, what we are offered is best described as a cultural analysis of the dependence of
master on slave. On the one hand, this analysis minimizes or altogether ignores the brutal
subjugation of the slaves (e.g., lynching, torture, rape, overwork, and starvation) through
which masters sought to mediate or deny their dependence; on the other hand, it never comes
to terms with concrete forms of resistance (e.g., slowdowns, sabotage, escape, rebellion)
through which slaves sought to win relative or absolute independence. One thus misses an
appreciation of the extent to which the slaveholding South's communitarian conception of
itself can be viewed as the neurotic projection of a society shot through with discord and
conflict.
61
62
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than it illuminates. It is obvious, once said, that the idealist analysis
suggested by Hegel's philosophical reflections on mastery and slavery
in the Phenomenology and the materialist analysis demanded by the
historical expression of mastery and slavery in America are radically
incommensurable. Left unsaid, this fundamental incommensurability
or irreducibility is likely to remain unacknowledged, and its implica- ·
tions left unexplored. In view of what has been said thus far, we
might be tempted to think that the disparity between Hegel's allegory
and the American past forces our hand: we must choose Hegel or
history. This conclusion, however, would be wrong. The matter does
not end here. For it is precisely in the faultline of the obvious difference (rather than with a presumed identity) between Hegel's allegory
and our history that we find a tentative foothold for their critical contemporary engagement. The challenge, as I see it, is to read Hegel on
mastery and slavery within and at the same time against the (Hegelian) grain: to read his dialectical construct dialectically.
The crucial initial step in such a reading is essentially historicist
and quintessentially Hegelian: 63 this would be a marking of the sociocultural position from which this particular reader's engagement with
Hegel's dialectic was launched. To put it simply: I cannot approach a
discussion of the story of the lord and the bondsman without remembering that I am the twentieth-century son of African-American
slaves. This by no means implies that my genealogy gives me a special
purchase on the dialectic of mastery and servitude; such an assertion
of interpretive privilege would be ludicrous. What the recognition of
my situation with respect to Hegel and to the history of American
slavery does indicate is that I do not and cannot come to Hegel's account blind to the ontological, and with it, the epistemological horizon this fact imposes on my encounter with that text. When I mark
my peculiar position in this particular community of Hegel readers, I
cannot avoid what I view as a healthy skepticism about the extent to
which Hegel's allegory on the construction of subjective mind helps
us understand the actual history of African slavery in America. This
skepticism is deepened when I consider that our engagement with the
Hegelian dialectic occurs across such a wide temperal divide: over a
century has passed since the end of American slavery, and nearly two
centuries separate us from the age in which Hegel composed his alle63 Robert Solomon has contended that "insofar as Hegel was a historicist in any significant
sense, it was not the way in which he ever thought of himself or his philosophy." R. Solomon,
supra note 46, at 15 n.23. This assertion is true only to the extent that one views "historicism"
as a code-word for "relativism." If the term is used to describe a method which is always
cognizant of the "time-boundedness" of its perspective, there is no doubt that historicism is a
central feature of the Hegelian project.
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gory of the struggle for recognition as a phenomenological stage in
Spirit's development.
This skepsis, however, should not be read as a call to dismiss
Hegel out of hand. To be sure, I am not particularly interested in
offering an interpretation of mastery and slavery in America "inspired
by" (in Professor Binder's words) Hegel's account of mastery and
slavery. One of the tasks of this Paper has been to show why the path
of a faithful application of the Hegelian text can only lead to an impasse. But here I should add one further-and for me, decisiveargument against the notion that Hegel's phenomenological description of mastery and slavery is a useful "tool" that we can "apply" in
an effort to reach some hermeneutic understanding of the lived experience of masters and slaves in antebellum America. Forcibly stated,
the point is this: in a very real sense, the history of mastery and slavery in America is not yet finished. 64 Anyone who is willing to take an
honest look at the current condition of African-Americans will see
that the badges, if not the incidents of servitude are still with us, in
myriad subtle and not so subtle forms. 65 If Hegel's dialectic of mastery and slavery is to hold any value for the contemporary critique of
racist domination, it must first undergo a process of positive
deformation.
C.L.R. James, the great Trinidadian student of Hegel, makes an
important point in his Notes on Dialectics which bears remarking
here. James insists that the key to the Hegelian dialectic lies in
Hegel's insight that "[t]hought is not an instrument you apply to a
content. The content moves, develops, changes, and creates new categories of thought, and gives them direction." "[O]ne of the chief er64 This is a large claim, and one that considerations of space obviously do not permit me to
develop fully. Perhaps the best single volume examination of the persistent workings of relations of racist domination in the United States from slavery to the present is M. Marable, How
Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America (1983).
6 5 Although the point remains undeveloped, Professor Binder implicitly concedes as much
toward the end of the section entitled "The Masters Mastered: How the Slaves Civilized the
South." It merits quoting here:
.
If the patient reader remains skeptical that slaves provided their masters with
models of gentility, community, and honor, she need only reflect on the south as
we have witnessed it in our lifetimes, the south of the civil rights struggles. Which
side in those struggles exhibited the courtesy, dignity, courage and refusal to brook
insult that we associate with southern gentry? Who, in those confrontations of
barbaric violence with disciplined nonviolence, civilized whom?
Binder, supra note 8, at 1475.
Professor Binder misses the larger lesson to be drawn from these encounters, which took
place some one hundred years after slavery. It might be usefully formulated in a question: If
the history of African slavery in the American South is the story of the way slaves conferred
"aristocratic values" upon their masters, is one not forced to conclude in light of the civil
rights struggle that this history is the story, ultimately, of a massive failure?
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rors of thought," James writes, "is to continue to think in one set of
forms, categories, ideas, etc., when the object, the content, has moved
on, has created or laid the premises for an extension, a development of
thought. " 66
The chief lesson I take from James's injunction is this: if we
would reach some understanding of the history of American mastery
and slavery, the object of a tum to Hegel's reflections on the struggle
for recognition between lord and bondsman cannot be a scrupulous
appropriation of the Hegelian narrative, but instead, a strategic deviation. To endlessly retell Hegel's story of the master and the slave
without rewriting it is to court the danger that these philosophical
concepts will be perpetually outrun by the changing historical object
they seek to grasp.
A.

Hegel and the Inverted World

Accordingly, I want to endorse an interpretive strategy which
takes its inspiration from the basic gesture of the Afro-American
trickster tale. That strategy might be best described as a rigorous
double-crossing of the Hegelian text. How is this claim to be understood? The project of such a reading is not just a simple inversion or
reversal. To double-cross Hegel is to double back, to double over, to
double-step the Hegelian categories, as though dancing inside one's
own head. To "apply" Hegel's allegory of mastery and slavery to the
history of African-American slavery is simply to rehearse a timebound, frozen gesture, the interpretive equivalent of a tableau based
on a painting of a minuet party in a Prussian salon. A "double-crossing" of Hegel's account of mastery and slavery harnesses his descriptive terms while driving them toward conclusions far different than
those reached in the Phenomenology. We start with Hegel knowing
that our object of study-the history of African slavery in Americademands that we then "move on" (aujheben) past him.
One is almost tempted to say that there is a sense in which we
must be willing to betray Hegel if we would be faithful to the Hegelian
dialectic. This statement, however, would not be completely true, for
an interpretive program that works within but against Hegel is implicitly urged upon us by the Phenomenology itself. I cannot develop
these points fully here, but I would simply note that behind Hegel's
assertion in the preface to the Phenomenology that the "inner meaning" of a philosophical work is to be found not just in its cognitive
results, but rather in the result together with the process through
66

C. James, Notes on Dialectics 15 (1980).
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which it came about, 67 stands a conception of the fundamentally motive structure of speculative thought. Much the same may be said of
the "speculative proposition" (spekulativer Satz), which Hegel describes in the preface as the fundament of dialectic thinking. The deductive proposition central to traditional philosophy posits a stable
subject and a variable predicate, and spends its energy in keeping the
two terms separate and distinct. For example, in the well-known
maxim, Lex punit mendacium, the first term, "law" is set up in opposition to a "falsehood" that is its repudiated other. The maxim, of
course, is undermined by another: Fictio est contra veritatem, se prop
veritate habetur (Fiction is against the truth, but it is to be esteemed
truth)-the very category of the fictio legis or legal fiction indicates
that "falsehood" is in a very real sense a constitutive postulate of the
"law" against which it is propositionally pitted. The "dialectical
movement" of the speculative reading of this proposition destroys the
distinction through a "counter-thrust against that subject-predicate
relationship": 68 subject passes over (or on Hegel "disappears") into
predicate, and the predicate in tum doubles back upon its subject,
changing both, and shaking the firm foundations to which traditional
philosophy mistakenly takes them to be fixed. Subject (for example,
"law") and object (for example, "falsehood") are not simply self-identical; they acquire their identities and thus their meaning for us in
dynamic differential relation to one another.
Moreover, like the movement of the dialectic whose unfolding it
seeks to chart, speculative thinking is essentially parataxic, understanding that term in its etymological sense as in "an arranging in
order for battle. " 69 To deploy an earlier figure, we might say that the
dance of dialectics is a war dance. Dialectical thinking views the
world of concepts as a world inhabited by apparent antagonists who
"'do battle with knives and then sit themselves down together at dinner as if nothing had happened.' •'7° As Frederic Jameson puts it,
dialectical thinking is "marked by the will to link together in a single
figure two incommensurable realities, two independent codes or sysPhenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 21.
Id. para. 61.
69 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1047-48 (1967).
70 The image comes from Bertolt Brecht, who contends that in Hegelian philosophy,
" 'concepts were always rocking in a rocking-chair, something that makes a very good initial
impression until it falls over backwords.'" D. Verene, Hegel's Recollection 119-20 (1985)
(quoting B. Brecht, Fliichtingsgespriiche (D. Verene trans. 1961)). For Brecht, Hegel's great
achievement (particularly in the Greater Logic) was to capture the "'slippery, unstable'" life
of concepts: " 'What order affirms, disorder, its inseparable partner, opposes at once, in one
breath where possible. They can neither live without one another nor with one another.' " Id.
67

68
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terns of signs, two heterogenous and asymmetrical terms." 71 Dialectical method apprehends the movement of a constellation of warring
and yet wedded forces which depend on one another for their meaning and material effects.
This understanding of thought as an active, antagonistic interplay between concepts and the objects they aim to comprehend is central to Hegel's speculative procedure. It should be central as well to
any contemporary critical encounter between Hegel on mastery and
slavery and the history of mastery and slavery in America. This is all
the more true in light of the premise with which I started in the opening pages of this paper. I suggested there that the terms for a contemporary critique of the history of mastery and slavery in America are
immanent in the record left of that experience by those who lived
through it. Respect for the historical specificity of African slavery in
America militates against its easy assimilation to the interpretive categories and course of the Phenomenology. If we take that experience
and the hermeneutic understanding it offers seriously, we may well
find that the force of its collision with Hegel's story of the master and
slave propels us away from the drama of lordship and bondage toward two other key moments in the Phenomenology. Although
neither of these passages figure in Professor Binder's interpretation,
both are crucial for an understanding of the place of the master-slave
allegory in the larger project of the· Phenomenology, since they frame
his narrative of the life-and-death struggle for recognition. The first is
the account of "Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Scepticism
and the Unhappy Consciousness," which follows the allegory of mastery and slavery. The second, which precedes it, is the discussion of
the inverted or "topsy-turvy" world in the chapter entitled "Force
and the Understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World." I
will take them up in here in reverse order. 72
Hans Gadamer has called Hegel's discussion of the inverted or
"topsy-turvy" world-the "verkehrte Welt"-"one of the most central in the structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit. " 73 It is also withF. Jameson, supra note 6, at 6.
Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, paras. 197-230; id. paras. 132-65. Needless to
say, the limits of this paper preclude an extended consideration of either of these two passages.
Happily, for our purposes we need only highlight those moments in each which help textually
situate Hegel's narrative of mastery and slavery.
73 H.-G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic 35 (P. Smith trans. 1976). In addition to the essay in
this text on "Hegel's 'Inverted World,'" my discussion here relies heavily on J. Hyppolite,
Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (S. Chemiak & J. Heckman trans.
1974); R. Solomon, supra note 46; Bossart, Hegel on the Inverted World, 13 Philosophical F.
326 (1982); Flay, supra note 56; Zimmerman, Hegel's "Inverted World" Revisited, 13 Philosophical F. 342 (1982).
71
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out question one of the more difficult passages in this notoriously
difficult work. The concept-image of the inverted world appears toward the end of Hegel's phenomenology of sense-certainty, perception, and understanding, which for Hegel comprise the three forms of
natural consciousness. Hegel deploys this metaphor of the inverted
world to plot the movement of mind from simple consciousness toward self-consciousness, the subject of the next chapter of the Phenomenology, in which he offers the allegory of lordship and bondage.
At the moment of its appearance in the narrative, Hegel is describing
the phenomenological cul-de-sac of understanding. As a form of consciousness, understanding is superior to both sense-certainty and perception, the two stages of knowing that proceed it in Hegel's account.
Sense-certainty, the first of the forms of consciousness dissected
by Hegel, is also the lowest, because it mistakenly conceives the
"thing" it seeks to know "as wholly independent of and unaffected by
the manner in which we are aware of it": 74 sense-certainty posits a
fixed, but (as we shall see) false line of division between the individual
subject or knower and the particular object to be known. Hegel
shows that sense-certainty is ensnared in the bare individuality and
particularity of its "immediate knowledge": it clings to the "here and
now," and is unable to see that "this" object that "I" sense is always
already doubly "mediated." The first mediate relationship is between
the individual subject and the particular object: as Hegel says, "I have
this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it [the
'thing'], similarly, is in sense-certainty through something else, viz.
through the 'I.' " 75 The second mediate relationship is internal to the
subject on the one side, and the object on the other: in any given instance of knowing, the determinate identities of both the knower and
the known are articulated differentially, that is, in negative rather
than positive terms. According to Hegel, the "local" moment in
which "I" sense that "this" computer keyboard before me is what I
take it to be, mobilizes and is inscribed in a "global" system of differences. The moment in which I determine what the object is (for example, a computer) is at one and the same time a moment in which I
distinguish the object from what it is not (for example, a typewriter).
Similarly, the "I" who sees and hears and touches "this" computer is
differentially positioned at that moment in a mediate relation to another "I" who senses the typewriter. In short, in sense-certainty,
neither the subject nor the object of knowledge can escape their dependence on the universal "I" and "this" in which their particularity
74
75

Bossart, supra note 73, at 329.
Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 92.
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is imbedded. Sense-certainty appears to be "the richest kind of knowledge,"76 but it is in fact the most impoverished. It is unwittingly and
inescapably implicated in a dialectic of the subject and object, of the
particular and the universal, of the ·mediate and the immediate, of
identity and difference.
Perceptual-consciousness marks an advance over sense-certainty
primarily because it "takes what is present to it as a universal." 77 Perception is able to grasp the many different properties that give an object its identity. What perception cannot do is reconcile the unity and
uniqueness of a thing with the diversity and universality of its properties. 78 Perception, like the form of consciousness it (partially) overcame, is still sensory ; it thus lacks a distinctively conceptual apparatus
which would allow it to view the object of which it is conscious as an
identity-in-difference. Perception "interpret[s] and characterize[s] its
object as a sensibly accessible object, as a universal conditioned by
sense. " 79 Hegel argues that the reconciliation of the thing and its
properties, of its self-same identity and its constitutive difference requires a conception of the object which does not "originate[ J in the
sensuous," and which,. accordingly, is not "conditioned by it." 80
Such a conception of the two aspects of the object can be
achieved only through the understanding-consciousness, through the
intervention of thought as such. What distinguishes understanding
from sense-certainty and perception is its ability conceptually to grasp
the substance of an object as a tensed unity of identity (with itself)
and difference (from another). Understanding-consciousness conceives the object as a process or movement within the object between
unity and multiplicity, between identity and difference: "[This] movement is what is called Force." 81
The effort of understanding to establish the unity of this concept
of the object as force soon runs into a problem. Understanding initially represents this image of the object as force to itself, as one concept made up of two distinct moments: "Force proper" and "Force
expressed." "Force proper" is for understanding the "unmanifest and
withdrawn" aspect of the object, while "Force expressed" is the sensible manifestation by Force of its non-sensuous identity. Hegel shows
that the posited distinction made by understanding between the singular, self-contained identity of force and its manifold, sensuous expres76

77

78
79
80
81

Id. para. 91.
Id. para. 111.
Bossart, supra note 73, at 331.
Zimmerman, supra note 73, at 344.
Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 129.
Id. para. 136.
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sion is a false abstraction. This is so because whatever it is that brings
"Force proper" to express and then return to itself "directly proves to
be itself Force." 82 As Hegel puts it, the unified concept of force
becomes real or "actual [only] through its duplication into two
Forces." 83 "The object is not a single force with two moments. It is
rather two forces, involved in a ceaseless interplay, a ceaseless transition of each into each." 84 With the disappearance of the assumed autonomy of "Force proper," consciousness is thrown from the
conceptual back into the phenomenal world.
In an attempt to find its way again, to regain the foothold it
found in its unified conception of one force with two distinct moments, understanding-consciousness resorts to the image of a noumenal or interior world which stands behind the sensuous object. This
interior realm is mediated by the phenomenal appearance of the object, but is itself a "supersensible," and (for understanding-consciousness) "true" world situated (variously) "above" or "beyond" the
sensual "perceived world" of appearance. The important point to
note about this supersensible world is that it accords a measure of
security to understanding-consciousness. Threatened by this vision of
the object world as a chaotic interplay of forces, understanding seeks
refuge in the posited stability of the supersensible realm which is "the
interior of the phenomenal world [of appearances] and its calm
copy." 85 Understanding thus tries to contain and control the restless
"play of Forces" by ordering it in the image of an abstract, regulatory
"law of Force," "which is the stable image of unstable appearance....
[T]he supersensible world is an inert realm of laws which, though beyond the perceived world-for this exhibits law only through incessant change-is equally present in it and its direct tranquil image." 86
There are certain things, however, that this law cannot do.
Hegel shows that understanding-consciousness must eventually confront two hard facts. First, understanding must reckon with the phenomenal remainder of reality as the play of forces which reality as a
single law of force finally cannot explain: it is not enough to simply
banish change and ceaseless diversity from "the tranquil kingdom" of
the law of force, to keep change, difference, and alteration outside it.
Second, understanding must come to terms with the risks entailed in
any move to expand and revise the singular law to explain this pheId. para. 138.
Id. para. 141.
84 De Nys, Force and Understanding: The Unity of the Object of Consciousness, in
Method and Speculation in Hegel's Phenomenology 57, 59 (M. Westphal ed. 1982).
85 Bossart, supra note 73, at 334.
86 Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 149.
82
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nomenal surplus: such an attempt would strip the objects brought
under the covering law of force of their felt, phenomenal difference or
restate the law of force at so abstract a level as to rob it of its determinate, explanatory power. This of course would undermine its claim to
be called a "law" at all. In the face of this difficulty, understanding
comes to see that it needs· "a conception of law and its denoted supersensible object in which difference and phenomenality as such are integral, internal dimensions. " 87
This is a task which falls to the doctrine of the inverted world.
Under the laws of this second supersensible, inverted world "what is
like in the first world is unlike to itself, and what is unlike in the first
world is equally unlike to itself, or it becomes like itself." 88 Hegel
describes the order of the "topsy-turvy" world in its "determinate
moments" as one in which what the law of the first supersensible
world deems sweet the law of the second, inverted world makes sour,
what is black in the first is white in the second; the south pole of the
second world is the north pole of the first; the punishment which in
the law of the first world brings disgrace and destruction upon the
criminal "is transformed in its inverted world into the pardon which
preserves his essential being and brings him to honour. " 89
Although it appears at first glance that this second, inverted
world is the opposite of the first, and stands outside it, Hegel insists
that this is not the case. The doctrine of the "verkehrte Welt" does
not maintain that first supersensible world is a world of appearance,
while the second supersensible world is a real world, or, in Hegel's
terms, "the in-itself." We should not mistakenly conclude, then, that
the lesson to be drawn from the inverted world is that "what tastes
sweet is really, or inwardly in the thing, sour; or what is north pole in
the actual magnet in the world of appearance, would be the south pole
in the inner or essential being," 90 or that acts which constitute a crime
in the world of appearance are really honorable. Hegel's claim is far
more radical: the opposition between inner nature and outer manifestation, between appearance and the supersensible, viewed as "two different kinds of actuality," 91 no longer holds.
Rather they are opposites which mutually determine one another,
for if one of these opposed elements is present in the sensible world
its inverted form must also be represented sensibly. In other
words, the distinction between appearance and reality has been
87
88
89
90
91

Zimmerman, supra note 73, at 361.
Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 158.
Id.
Id. para. 159.
Id.
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pushed so far that it has destroyed itself. This is the truth contained implicitly in such earlier moments of the dialectic as force
[proper] and the play of forces. 92

The inverted world thus brings the world of appearance into itself; it
"has at the same time overarched the other world and has it within it
... it is itself and its opposite in one unity." 93 In the inverted world,
difference is revealed to be contradiction, an "inner difference, or difference in its own self, or difference as an infinity," 94 in which "the
thing is not bounded by an opposite alien and external to itself. " 95
Having passed through this inverted world, understanding-consciousness itself undergoes a similar experience of inversion and assimilation which undoes the fixed difference it posits between itselfthe subject of knowledge-and the world-the object it would know.
In the final paragraph of the chapter, Hegel puts the point as follows:
This curtain [of appearance] hanging before the inner world is
therefore drawn away, and we have the inner being [the "I"] gazing into the inner world-the vision of the undifferentiated selfsame being, which repels itself from itself, posits itself as an inner
being containing different moments, but for which equally these
moments are immediately not different-self-consciousness. It is
manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to
conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we go
behind it ourselves, as much in order that we may see, as that there
may be something behind there which can be seen. 96

In crossing the bar between the noumenal and phenomenal world,
"the I is absolutely other, and yet this other is the l."97 Understanding comes to see that subject and object mutually condition one
another, that subject and object are constitutively related. Understanding is thus brought to a transformative knowledge of itself
through the mediation of the object. It is this self-consciousness
which, desiring certainty of itself, comes to struggle with another selfconsciousness for acknowledgement or recognition.

B. Hegel and Afro-American Slavery
To return from this digression to the history of master and slavery which is our object of study, I want to show briefly how Hegel's
doctrine of the "verkehrte Welt" permits us to see the dialectical
92
93
94
95

96
97

Bossart, supra note 73, at 336.
Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 160.
Id.
J. Findlay, Analysis of the Text to id. para. 160.
Id. para. 165.
J. Hyppolite, supra note 73, at 139.
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"turning of the tables" which Professor Binder finds in the allegory of
lordship and bondage in another light. For Professor Binder, Hegel's
story of mastery and slavery teaches that freedom must be anchored
in communitarian politics: "[Hegel] aimed to show that freedom had
to be conceived as some form of association rather than independence;
and that it had to be mediated by politics rather than defended from
politics." 98 On Professor Binder's account, it was through the assimilation of the timocratic culture of their slaves that the Southern
master class came to recognize the impossibility of a freedom cut off
from the life of communal politics.
Professor Binder takes great pains to anticipate and defend his
thesis from the skeptical reader, who would find only paradox in the
claim that white Southerners erected a common political culture on
the foundations laid by black slaves who, as such, had no claim to
membership in community and no right to participate in politics. The
beginnings of an answer to those who doubt the civilizing role played
by the African slave in the antebellum South can be found, I believe,
in Hegel's image of the topsy-turvy world. If we link the allegory of
the master and slave up to the image of the "verkehrte Welt," we can
see how the logic of the former is prefigured in and to some extent
intelligible only in terms of the latter. As Hans Gadamer has noted,
the German phrase, "verkehrte Welt" carries a double sense. It simultaneously evokes the image of inversion and the image of perversion. 99
The first is formal and descriptive, suggesting a world turned upside
down, inside out, backwards; the second is substantive and evaluative,
connoting a corrupted, distorted state of affairs. 100 Working with this
double meaning, we can plot the deceptive movement whereby the
slaves "mastered" the slaveholders as the inversion of a perversion.
In the section of his paper entitled, "Beyond Independence: The
Masters' Freedom," Professor Binder (following Ken Greenberg) argues that the Southern slaveholders' ambivalence about the concept of
independence led them to recast the ideology of republicanism from
an individualist into a communitarian mold. 101 This ideological reworking took the discursive form of a blurring (one might say a rejection) of the traditional lines between public and private, or more
specifically, domestic and civil affairs. The classical conception of
politics as a realm which ·was distinct from and opposed to private life
Binder, supra note 8, at 1435.
H.-G. Gadamer, supra note 73, at 48.
100 Id. at 35 n. l (translator's note).
101 Binder, supra note 8, at 1456-58. Professor Binder goes so far to find a degree of ambivalence about individual autonomy in republicanism itself which, for him, does not justify the
privileged position accorded it in the conventional understanding of that ideology.
98
99
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was stood on its head. In a sense, the Southern master class rediscovered the lost treasure of what Hannah Arendt has described as the
core ideal of the revolutionary tradition: they rehabilitated the notion,
long since abandoned by their Northern counterparts, that the content of freedom could be found only if one were " 'a participator in
the government of affairs.' " 102 What was distinctive about the Southern conception of political freedom as active membership in community was the language used to describe it. Southern statesmen, Binder
tells us, spoke of their roles in terms of fatherhood, family, and kinship.. In this idealized vision of the polis as a happy household, the
slaves were members of a family of which the master was the head.
Given what we know, however, about the degradation and suffering of life under servitude, the place of the slave in this "family" can
only be described as that of a "sort of seventh son" (to use Du Bois's
phrase). 103 Extending the line of thought begun in my earlier discussion of the slave's discreet subversion of the Southern rituals of civility, I want here simply to note the degree to which the deferential
gesture of the slave was not only parodic, but "impolitic" in a discreet
but decisive political sense. Professor Binder persuasively shows that
white Southerners recognized the extent to which their freedom as
participants in a common politic derived from the unfreedom of the
African slave: we have no reason to doubt their publicly expressed
belief that " 'perfect equality of civil and social privilege [shared]
among the white population [of the South] ... exist[ed] solely because
[it had] black slaves.' " 104 Professor Binder stops short of the conclusion about the nature qf the Southern political "family" toward which
this fact should take us.
If the freedom of the antebellum master class was " 'not possible
without slavery,' •nos then we must view the teaching of the slaves as
a doubly contradictory lesson. In the first lesson, on Southern cultural life, we were shown that the civility of the slave is the inverted
image of the incivility of the master. In the second lesson, on Southern political life, we learn that the master's freedom originates in the
unfreedom of his slaves. Both lessons grow out of the same dialectical
moment: the ·assimilation by the master class of an aristocratic ethos
which originates with the slaves. Although Professor Binder cor102 H. Arendt, On Revolution 126 (1963) (quoting Thomas Jefferson). It is significant, in
this context, that Arendt is quoting Thomas Jefferson, who was himself a Southerner and a
slaveholder.
103 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk 45 (1969).
104 Binder, supra note 8, at 1448 (quoting J. Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders 141 (1982)).
105 Id.
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rectly describes both sides of this moment, he misreads its normative
implications, and misapprehends its concrete historical consequences.
What is missing in his analysis is a sense of conflict posed here between civility and civism-between politesse and politics. Consequently, Professor Binder is unable to gain a critical hold on the
deeply problematic nature of communitarian politics in the antebellum South. How is this claim to be understood?
It is a commonplace in political theory, at least as old as Aristotle, that the slave belongs not to civil, but to domestic society. As
Aristotle put it, " 'there is no polis for slaves.' " 106 The life of slaves
"runs its course outside the literally civil society which as such defines
and contrasts itself by reference to them." 107 Because the status of the
slave (or as Taney put it in Dred Scott "the degraded condition of this
unhappy race" 108) precluded the political standing necessary to confer
citizenship, the ethos of civility he imparted to his master could not
translate into authentic civism. The dialectical moment of the Southern civilizing process is thus a moment of irreducible contradiction: it
underwrites the emergence of the forms of communal politics, and at
the same time underscores its substantive impossibility. And in fact,
the historical record indicates that for all its efforts to fashion a positive conception of freedom, the Southern master class was always
thrown back on a negative view of freedom. This was a conception of
freedom which, while not defining itself in opposition to the state as
such, forged an image of itself in regional terms as a value to be protected against Northern encroachment, and in racial terms as a value
to be preserved by the perpetuation of African slavery. By the end of
the Civil War, this political world was to be turned upside down. But
the suicidal outcome of that war was simply the culmination of a process begun long before its first shots were fired. The cultural and
political associations white Southerners built up among themselves
derived their meaning in large part from the relation of domination in
which they stood to their subjugated slaves. The insistent but unheeded message of slavery was not so much that individual freedom
was derived from collective dependence; rather, the teaching of the
slaves was that the ethos of dependency on which the masters' freedom was founded could not be built on domination. While on the loss
of war, it was only a matter of time before the Southern master class
would be confronted by the painful recognition that its freedom was
10 6 M. Reidel, 'State' and 'Civil Society': Linguistic Context and Historical Origin, in Between Tradition and Revolution 129, 137 (W. Wright trans. 1984) (quoting Aristotle).
101 Id.
10s Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 409 (1857).
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in fact no freedom at all: white Southerners had deluded themselves
into believing that they could erect a civic community on the shifting
sands of a cultured but coerced civility.
The world of the masters was a world turned upside down. The
world of the slaves was a world rent in two. If the dialectical drama
of the master and slave is in a sense prefigured in the allegory of the
inverted world, it is reenacted in the reflections which follow it on the
"ungluckliches Bewusstein" or "Unhappy Consciousness." Together
with stoicism and skepticism, the unhappy (unlucky, misfortunate, or
ill-fated) consciousness is a form of consciousness which tries to think
itself out of "the impasse engendered by the Master and Slave conflict." 109 In the state of affairs with which Hegel ends the allegory of
the Lord and Bondsman, neither the master nor the slave has
achieved full self-consciousness. The master has demanded and received a defective, unilateral recognition from the slave, and is free to
enjoy the fruits of the slave's labor without working himself. The
slave has avoided death, but also forfeited the possibility of recognition by his adversary. What is granted to him in servitude, however,
is the experience of discipline and work. The slave, to be sure, does
not consume what his work produces: this is the prerogative of the
master. In working on the world, however, the slave transforms it.
Accordingly, the slave comes to a recognition that he "shape[s] himself by shaping things . . . . [I]n the product of his work, he finds
himself." 110
The "impasse" lies in the fact that full self-consciousness is possible only if the freedom and recognition possessed by the master and
the discipline and labor experienced by the slave are integrated.
Hegel concludes "that neither the master nor the slave is fully capable
of self-realization, since the experience of self-consciousness is fragmented and divided between them." 111 In the Unhappy Consciousness, writes Hegel, "the duplication which formerly was divided
between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged in
one." 112 The Unhappy Consciousness, on Charles Taylor's description, "is both the immutable self-identical subject of thought and the
individual who is subject to the changeable world." 113 The problem is
that this consciousness experiences its bifurcation not as an integrated
unity, but rather as an interior division of a single self, as a "dual109
110
111
112
113

A. Prior, supra note 53, at 63.
J. Hyppolite, supra note 73, at 176.
R. Norman, supra note 59, at 55.
Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 206.
C. Taylor, Hegel 160 (1975).

1989]

A HOUSE DIVIDED

1513

natured [doubled], merely contradictory being." 114
This unhappy, inwardly disrupted consciousness, since its essentially contradictory nature is for it a single consciousness, must for
ever have present in the one consciousness the other also; and thus
it is driven out of each in tum in the very moment when it
imagines it has successfully attained to a peaceful unity with the
other. 115

In a desperate attempt to live with itself, this Unhappy Consciousness
tries to invent the possibility of its self-unification. We will not review
all the (ultimately unsuccessful) attempts made by this form o( consciousness to overcome or at least accept its bifurcation. 116 Suffice it
to say that they bear an uncanny resemblance to the beliefs and practices of the Western world's dominate religious tradition: the Unhappy Consciousness, for Hegel, "is the inevitable result of the
contradictions of Christian dualistic thought." 117
In any case, I am less concerned here with the ideological predicate of the Unhappy Consciousness than I am with the phenomenological posture that Hegel takes it to represent. What interests me in
this context is, first, the fact of the split in consciousness itself and,
second, its effect on the lived interior experience of this form of consciousness alienating. In an earlier part of this Paper, I argued that
Professor Binder's account of the politics of the dialectic of civility
was derived from too narrow a conception of the psychic life of the
African slave. I suggested that servitude was a crucible in which the
slave forged a double mind, "one mind for white folks to see, 'nother
for what I know is me." 118 My point there was to show how and why
attention to the bifurcated consciousness of the slave permits a deeper
understanding of political freedom in the antebellum South than Professor Binder's analysis allows. What I did not consider in these earlier pages, and want in closing briefly to take up now, is the inner
damage to African slaves wrought by the experience of this constantly
improvised, split self, for whom "everything solid and stable" was being continually "shaken to its foundations." 119 The classic statement
Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 206.
Id. para. 207.
l 16 See J. Shklar, Freedom and Independence: A Study of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of
Mind' (1976); C. Taylor, supra note 113.
117 T. Schroyer, The Critique of Domination 69 (1973).
1 1 s See supra text accompanying note 30.
119 I have deliberately appropriated the image Hegel uses to describe what the self-consciousness of servitude is "in and for itself." Hegel views this experience of "absolute negativity" or "pure-being-for-self" in a rather positive light: it is the "simple, essential nature of selfconsciousness." Phenomenology of Spirit, supra note 33, para. 194. For my part, I would be
remiss not to point up its darker side.
114
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of this dilemma in social theory is W.E.B. Du Bois's The Souls of

Black Folks:
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted
with second-sight in this American world,-a world which yields
him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself
through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at
one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One
ever feels his twoness,-an American, a Negro; two souls, two
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one
dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn
asunder.
The history of the American Negro is the history of this
strife,-this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his
double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes
neither of the older selves to be lost. ... He simply wishes to make
it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American .... 120
Writing at the tum of the century, DuBois's phenomenological description of what it means to be an American citizen of African descent shows that the double consciousness which allowed the slaves to
survive the experience of chattel slavery seems to have been passed on
to their descendants. I read this passage as an extended meditation on
the insight of the African-American clergyman who, two years after
the Civil War, warned, "[the] people are emancipated but not free!" 121
In this, the history of Africans in postbellum America ratifies Hegel's
philosophical injunction that the "elimination of slavery ... does not
yet end man's [sic] sense of being a servant." 122 While they, unlike
their forbears, did not live out their lives in the dark night of slavery,
they were never able to escape its shadow. Emancipation of the African-American may have marked the end of the incident of servitude;
its mere proclamation could not erase the badges of that institution.
The political consciousness of African-Americans remained split, Unhappy Consciousness, imprisoned in a "halfway house" 123 on th~ road
from emancipation toward freedom. This is in part the meaning of my
earlier claim that the history of mastery and slavery in America is not
yet finished. That experience echoes even today in the jangling dissonance between the abstract ideals of equality and mutual recognition
of our "color-blind" legal and political systems and their distorted
Du Bois, supra note 103, at 45.
L. Litwack, Been in the Storm So long 457 (1980).
H.-G. Gadamer, supra note 73, at 71.
W. Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation 141 (1978).
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racist expression in the actual state of affairs. Like their ancestors,
contemporary African-Americans know what it means to harbor two
thoughts, two souls, two warring ideals, two inhabitants in a house
that is still divided against itself.

